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 Abstract. We explore the consequences of bad governance and corruption for 
public debt and welfare in a model of policymaking with time inconsistency. A 
decrease in institutional quality is supposed to adversely affect government 
revenue. The main point of this paper is that corruption can enhance welfare in 
two ways: first, by mitigating the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary 
policy; second, by reducing the loss due to the suboptimal distribution of 
distortions associated with debt accumulation. The paper thus invokes the lack 
of interest for explaining the prevalence of corruption in countries with low 
institutional quality that encounter a credibility problem in monetary 
management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Bad governance and corruption are regarded as an issue of major concern in many developing 
countries and now rank high on the agenda of both researchers and policymakers, as testified 
by the growing body of literature on the subject, and by the strong stance on the matter taken 
by the World Bank and other international organizations since the mid-1990s. The main 
reason for such an attention is that widespread corruption distorts the allocation of resources 
in the market system and disrupts competition, thereby acting as a deterrent to development 
and growth. Empirical studies provide support for the view that bad governance is likely to 
significantly harm economic performance through a wide range of channels. In particular, 
there is some evidence that corruption reduces growth by discouraging private investment 
(Mauro, 1995 and 1997), or by increasing public investment in unproductive projects 
(Davoodi and Tanzi, 1998), not to mention that public sector corruption also contributes to 
larger budget deficits when leading to tax evasion or improper tax exemptions (Tanzi, 1997).1 
However, are countries suffering from bad governance always ready to strengthen their 
institutions? In a recent article that models weak public governance as an erosion of the 
ability to collect revenue through regular tax channels, Huang and Wei (2006) argue that most 
of the usually prescribed solutions to the credibility problem of monetary policy are likely to 
fail in developing or transition economies with poor institutions. This is because the optimal 
inflation rate in such countries is higher than that normally implied by a monetary 
arrangement such as a fixed exchange rate or a currency board. More importantly, Huang and 
Wei (2006) show in their model that some nations might fall into what they call a “poor-
institution trap”. That is, in countries facing a very severe governance problem, the authorities 
                                                 
1.
 An interesting survey on the topic can be found in Jain (2001). 
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would no longer be willing to improve fiscal capacity and strengthen institutions from the 
moment that the cost of the reforms required to fight corruption exceeds a certain threshold. 
The present paper adds insight about the lack of incentive to improve governance and 
curtail corruption, in line with the findings of Huang and Wei (2006). Like them, we deal with 
the role of institutional quality for the design of monetary and fiscal policies by means of a 
game-theoretic approach that features time inconsistency in decisionmaking and in which 
corruption is assumed to negatively impact the amount of tax revenue. These two authors 
explore the impact of corruption under both commitment and discretion, but here we only 
discuss the discretionary case, this latter being more realistic for modeling a country faced 
with institutional failure. The major difference with Huang and Wei (2006) lies in the two-
period extension of their model for taking into account the consequences of corruption for 
public debt accumulation. 
The main point in this dynamic version is that corruption can theoretically enhance 
welfare. This result, which looks somewhat surprising at first sight, actually derives from the 
basic principle that the aggravation of one distortion in an already distorted world may raise 
overall welfare because these distortions tend to offset each other. Intuitively, in this model, 
the distortion due to the absence of monetary commitment can be counterbalanced by the 
distortion associated with fiscal corruption, with the final outcome that a country can be made 
better off. Hence, our analysis, too, suggests that some developing nations could be stuck in a 
poor-institution trap. However, it is worth mentioning that such a trap here follows from a 
positive net effect of corruption on welfare, unlike Huang and Wei (2006) who endogenize 
the quality of institutions in their article and explain the phenomenon of the trap by the cost of 
the reforms aimed at strengthening governance (on account, among other things, of the 
resistance of pressure groups that have been benefiting from corruption). 
5 
 
In our paper, lower institutional quality affects welfare in two ways. The first source of 
welfare losses is intratemporal and arises from the well-known time-inconsistency problem, 
when the decisionmaker attempts to increase the output level through unanticipated inflation 
(Barro and Gordon, 1983). As the incentive to generate an unexpected monetary shock is 
perceived by the private sector, the equilibrium inflation rate is higher under discretion than 
under commitment. In the presence of tax distortions, more corruption has a positive impact 
provided that the government gives priority to its output objective. Indeed, if the cost of 
collecting revenue in terms of foregone output and employment rises because of a higher 
corruption level, the best thing to do is to reduce distortionary taxation, hence an increase in 
economic activity, but also a mitigation of the inflationary bias associated with discretionary 
monetary policy. 
The second source of welfare losses stems from the intertemporal distribution of 
distortions across the two periods of the game. As already put forward by Beetsma and 
Bovenberg (1997) in a similar setup, the government is induced to employ debt policy 
strategically in the first period in order to influence second-period inflation expectations. 
Owing to that, the amount of public debt carried over from the first period into the second 
happens to be too low with respect to the optimum. However, we show in this model that the 
more serious the corruption problem, the greater will be the amount of public debt. Therefore, 
a weakening of governance can reduce the intertemporal loss by boosting public borrowing. 
The paper implies that the increasing relationship between the extent of corruption and the 
amount of indebtedness might be associated with a welfare-improving effect under some 
conditions, although it is regarded as a problem in most studies. More broadly, we think that 
the combination of these various effects could partly help to explain the governance problem 
that is observed in some developing or transition countries. Our study points to the fact that 
their authorities might essentially have little or no incentive to deal with the matter seriously. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The 
equilibrium public debt level and the welfare loss under discretion are computed in Section 3. 
Section 4 explores the impact of a change in institutional quality on the intratemporal loss 
component. Section 5 then turns to the consequences of corruption for debt accumulation and 
intertemporal losses. Section 6 finally offers a few concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. THE TWO-PERIOD MODELING FRAMEWORK 
 
The model is based on Alesina and Tabellini (1987) but extended to two periods to allow for 
public debt. It describes a game between two players: a representative worker, who sets the 
nominal wage rate at the beginning of each period, and the policymaker, who controls the 
inflation and tax rates and chooses the amount of public debt in the first period. This model is 
intended to examine the welfare consequences of one particular feature, namely institutional 
failure, which is more prevalent in economies suffering from a lack of monetary credibility, 
so it will be assumed throughout the paper that the policymaking authority is never able to 
commit to its announcements.2 
At any period t  ( 1, 2t = ), the log of output, tx , is given by a modified Lucas supply 
curve that allows the adverse impact of tax distortions to be taken into account:3 
                                                 
2
. Owing to space limitations, the details of the calculations will be omitted here, but two separate 
technical appendices to this paper are available from the author upon request. Appendix A presents 
all details of the derivation of the discretionary equilibrium. For the purpose of comparison, the 
results for the benchmark case with commitment are given in Appendix B. Note that the 
commitment solution is second-best only because non-distortionary (lump-sum) taxes are supposed 
to be unavailable to the authorities in this model. 
3
. The derivation of Equation (1) is standard. See Alesina and Tabellini (1987) for details. 
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e
t t t tx pi pi τ= − −  (1) 
 
where tpi  denotes the actual inflation rate and 
e
tpi  the expected inflation rate, and where tτ  is 
the tax rate on total output. For the sake of simplicity, there is no shock and the natural level 
of output is normalized to zero. Monetary policy can stimulate activity only if the actual 
inflation rate exceeds the expected inflation rate, since real wages then go down. As in 
Alesina and Tabellini (1987), fiscal policy exerts distortionary effects: any increase in the tax 
rate leads to a fall in profitability of firms and results in lower output. 
The budget constraint of the government creates a link both between fiscal and monetary 
policies within each period and between optimization decisions across both periods: 
 
( ) 11t t t t tg R d dpi βτ−+ + = + +  (2) 
 
where tg  denotes the level of public spending (as a share of output), 1td −  and td , 
respectively, are the amount of public debt carried over from the previous period and the 
amount of newly issued public debt, and R  is the (constant) real interest rate. As will be seen 
below, β  measures the revenue leakage due to corruption ( 0 1β≤ ≤ ) and is the key 
parameter here. 
The left-hand side of (2) represents the government’s total outlay: public spending, tg , 
and debt servicing costs, 1(1 ) tR d −+ . The right-hand side of (2) indicates the various sources 
of finance available to the authorities: seigniorage revenues, tpi , output tax revenues, tβτ , 
and new debt issuance, td . Contrary to advanced economies featuring low holdings of base 
money on account of efficient financial systems, seigniorage remains an important source of 
government revenue for developing countries. Without loss of generality, there is no debt in 
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0t =  and all debt must be paid off at the end of the second period of the game (i.e. 2 0d = ), 
so 1 1 1 1g dpi βτ= + +  and ( )2 1 2 21g R d pi βτ+ + = + . 
As in Huang and Wei (2006), institutional failure and corruption are supposed to lessen 
the government’s ability to collect revenue through regular tax channels and are modeled as a 
decrease in the value of the parameter β  in (2). This parameter can thus be thought of as a 
fiscal capacity or institution quality index intended to roughly capture the extent of 
corruption: the lower β , the greater will be the leakage of tax revenue. When 1β = , there is 
no corruption at all; in contrast, if 0β = , so serious is the public governance problem that the 
regular tax collection system collapses completely and the government can no longer collect 
tax.4 
As usual in this type of model, the policymaker’s quadratic loss function is increasing in 
the deviations of inflation, output and public spending from their targets: 
 
( )2 21 2 2 *
1
1
2
t
t x t g t t
t
V s s x s g gpiρ pi−
=
 
= + + −  ∑  (3) 
 
The targeted inflation rate is taken to be zero and corresponds to price stability. For 
convenience, the output target, too, is set equal to zero, without any consequence for our 
results: this is the natural output level reached in the absence of tax distortions (i.e. 0tτ = ) 
                                                 
4
. The corrupt practices undertaken by tax administration officials in return for bribes may 
significantly aggravate the leakage of tax revenues. Empirical evidence suggests that high 
corruption is associated with low tax revenues most of the time (Davoodi and Tanzi, 1998). The 
cases of Peru and Uganda quoted in Tanzi (1997) are particularly revealing in this respect: 
corruption became so pervasive in these countries that the existing administrations were dismantled 
and replaced by new ones. Another well-known example is the failure to undertake tax collection 
efficiently and equitably in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. 
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whenever the price level is correctly anticipated by the private sector (i.e. et tpi pi= ). Having an 
output target in excess of the natural level, as is usual in this class of models, would not affect 
our conclusions owing to the assumption * 0tg > : the need to provide public goods and the 
absence of lump-sum taxes are enough to generate the standard time-inconsistency problem 
and so an inflationary bias under discretion. spi , xs  and gs  denote the weights placed on the 
price stability, output and public spending objectives, respectively ( 1x gs s spi + + = ), and ρ  is 
the authorities’ subjective discount factor ( 0 1ρ< ≤ ). 
As will be clear below, the weights the policymaking authority attaches to the various 
arguments in the loss function (3) play a crucial role. In what follows, we shall mainly retain 
the assumption of a “weight-liberal” government that cares more about output and 
employment than price stability (i.e. xs spi> ). This assumption, indeed, is indispensable for 
highlighting the possibility of a welfare-improving impact of weak public governance 
(besides the fact that it permits us to explain why the policymaker comes up against a 
commitment problem and is unable to follow a monetary policy rule). Another possible 
justification lies in the fact that the authorities in countries where the institutional and political 
system is weak are likely to be more prone to populism in an attempt to increase their 
influence and reelection probability; within our very stylized framework, such a behavior 
could be captured, to some extent, by a small dislike for inflation (i.e. 0spi → ). 
 
 
3. PUBLIC DEBT AND WELFARE LOSSES UNDER DISCRETION 
 
In this dynamic framework, the decision regarding how much to borrow is made in the first 
period while taking into account the consequences of public debt issuance for second-period 
outcomes. In this way, the first-period policymaker acts as a Stackelberg leader when 
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determining the optimal debt stock, because debt policy can be used strategically with the aim 
of influencing future policy decisions (see the discussion by Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1997). 
The first-period policymaker equates the marginal benefit from issuing more debt (i.e. 
smaller losses in period one owing to lower tax distortions) to the (discounted) marginal cost 
(i.e. larger losses in period two because of a higher debt service burden). Equation (4a) below 
illustrates this intertemporal trade-off (see Appendix A for the details of the calculations): 
 
( ) ( ) *1 2*
1 1
1 1R R d g
g d
ρ  + Ξ + + 
− =
Ω
 
(4a) 
 
where ( ) ( )22 1x g x gs s s s spi β βΞ ≡ + + +  and ( ) ( )2 1x g x gs s s s spi β βΩ ≡ + + + . 
The left-hand side of (4a) corresponds to the gain in the first period resulting from public 
debt issuance. A higher stock of debt in period one allows the authorities to lower both 
inflation and corporate taxes (i.e. 1 1 0dpi∂ ∂ <  and 1 1 0dτ∂ ∂ < ), hence a rise in output (i.e. 
1 1 0x d∂ ∂ > ). Furthermore, public borrowing does more than compensate for the decrease in 
seigniorage and regular tax revenues, so government expenditure in period one goes up with 
the debt stock (i.e. 1 1 0g d∂ ∂ > ). 
The right-hand side of (4a) represents the cost of debt accumulation in period two. The 
term ( )1 Rρ + Ξ Ω  is referred as the authorities’ effective discount factor, in the sense that it 
varies according to the nature of the policy game and the commitment technology. The 
effective discount factor under discretion depends both on the policymaker’s preferences 
among the various economic objectives, as measured by spi , xs  and gs , and on the quality of 
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institutions, as captured by β .5  The higher the amount of public debt, the higher future 
inflation and tax rates (i.e. 2 1 0dpi∂ ∂ >  and 2 1 0dτ∂ ∂ > ), since a larger financing 
requirement will compel the authorities to raise tax and seigniorage revenues, hence a 
decrease in the second-period activity level (i.e. 2 1 0x d∂ ∂ < ). The level of public expenditure 
in period two also is decreasing in the amount of debt (i.e. 2 1 0g d∂ ∂ < ). 
It is straightforward to solve for the equilibrium debt stock under discretion from (4a): 
 
* *
1 2
1 1 (1 )
D
D
D
g gd
R
ρ
ρ
−
=
+ +
 (4b) 
 
where ( )1D Rρ ρ≡ + Ξ Ω  (the superscript “D” denoting discretion). 
Equation (4b) reveals the determinants of debt accumulation. The higher the government 
spending target in period one, the higher will be the stock of public debt (i.e. *1 1 0Dd g∂ ∂ > ). 
Conversely, the higher the second-period public spending target, the lower must be the 
equilibrium debt level (i.e. *1 2 0Dd g∂ ∂ < ). It is also easy to check that a higher effective 
discount factor increases the marginal cost of public borrowing, thereby restraining debt 
accumulation (i.e. 1 0D Dd ρ∂ ∂ < ). 
As in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), it is convenient to split the expression for society’s 
welfare loss for both periods into two parts, so as to distinguish the intratemporal from the 
intertemporal component: 
 
2
intra inter
D D DV L L= × × Ψ  (5a) 
 
                                                 
5
. The terms Ξ  and Ω  entering the expression for the effective discount factor are specific to the 
discretionary regime. It is shown in Appendix B that the effective discount factor under 
commitment is equal to ( )1 Rρ + . 
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where ( ) * *1 21 R g gΨ ≡ + + . 
The intratemporal loss factor, intra
DL , represents the distribution of distortions under 
discretion over the various available instruments within each period and therefore corresponds 
to the result that would be obtained in a simple one-shot game. The intertemporal loss factor, 
inter
DL , stems from the distribution of distortions across both periods and thus depends on the 
rate of time preference, as measured by the effective discount factor Dρ . These losses can be 
written as (see Appendix A for the details of the computations): 
 
intra 22
x gD s s sL pi
Ξ
=
Ω
 
(5b) 
 
( )
( )
2
inter 2
1 1
D
D
D
L
R
ρ ρ
ρ
+
=
 + + 
 (5c) 
 
It can be checked that both loss factors exceed the corresponding ones under commitment 
provided that 0β >  (see Appendix A and Appendix B). This results both from the well-
known incentive facing decisionmakers to employ inflation surprises for alleviating 
distortions and from the suboptimal intertemporal distribution of losses, as will be shown 
below. It is worth noting, however, that the commitment problem does not arise any longer in 
the case of a totally inefficient tax collection system because of corruption (i.e. 0β = ). As 
public spending could no longer be financed by regular taxes in such an extreme case, fiscal 
policy would be set only on the basis of the (natural) output target, thereby keeping the output 
gap at zero (i.e. 0t txτ = = ). The incentive to resort to unanticipated inflation for stimulating 
economic activity would then be eliminated and monetary policy would be determined 
according to the tradeoff between the price stability objective and the benefits of inflation in 
terms of seigniorage revenues. Consequently, the commitment and discretionary solutions 
coincide at 0β =  in this model. 
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Also note that corruption unambiguously harms social welfare under commitment, in 
contrast with the discretionary regime on which we focus here. As pointed out by Huang and 
Wei (2006), lower institutional quality (i.e. a decrease in the value of β ) leads to a higher 
equilibrium inflation rate under commitment to compensate for the lost revenue, and 
correspondingly to additional intratemporal losses, whereas the intertemporal loss factor 
remains unchanged in the dynamic version of the model (see Appendix B). 
 
 
4. CAN WEAK PUBLIC GOVERNANCE BOOST ECONOMIC ACTIVITY? 
 
This section explores the conditions under which weak public institutions and low fiscal 
capacity can boost employment and reduce the intratemporal welfare loss. For the moment we 
do not discuss the game dynamics created by debt accumulation. The consequences of 
corruption for the equilibrium amount of public debt and the intertemporal loss factor will be 
examined in the next section. 
According to (5b), the impact of a change in β  on intratemporal losses is given by: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )2 2 2
intra
3
1 1 2D x g x x g x gs s s s s s s s sL pi piβ β β β
β
 
− + − + +∂  
=
∂ Ω
 
(6) 
Furthermore, as the intratemporal component (5b) corresponds to the loss value in a game 
without public debt (i.e. 1 0d = ), the effects of corruption on inflation and the output tax rate 
at any period t  ( 1, 2t = ) are given by the following partial derivatives (see Appendix A): 
 
( )*
2
2x g t x gt s s s g s spi β βpi
β
 − +∂  
=
∂ Ω
 
(7) 
 
( )* 2
2
g t x g gt
s s g s s s s spi pi piβτ
β
 + −∂  
=
∂ Ω
 
(8) 
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The partial derivative of the intratemporal welfare loss component with respect to the 
fiscal capacity index (see (6)) allows us to formulate the first proposition below: 
 
Proposition 1. If the policymaker puts a large weight on output but attaches little importance 
to the price stability and public expenditure objectives, more corruption leads to a decrease in 
intratemporal welfare losses. 
 
Proof. intra 0
DL β∂ ∂ >  when 1xs →  and ,  0gs spi → . ■ 
 
This first result derives from the fact that corruption raises the cost of collecting revenue. 
All other things being equal, the corporate tax rate needed to supply a given amount of public 
goods goes up with the degree of leakage of public funds, hence a rise in the cost sustained by 
society in terms of foregone output and employment. Therefore, if the objective of stabilizing 
output around its natural level prevails over price stability and public goods provision, the 
optimal policy reaction to a worsening in institutional quality (i.e. a lower value of β ) is to 
reduce distortionary taxation (see (8): 0tτ β∂ ∂ >  for 1xs →  and ,  0gs spi → ). So the effect 
of an escalation of corruption on activity is positive in that case (i.e. 0tx β∂ ∂ < ). But this 
does not necessarily mean a shift of the revenue collection from regular tax to inflation tax. 
Actually, as can be seen from (7), when the policymaker primarily penalizes output 
deviations, the discretionary equilibrium inflation rate falls as well ( 0tpi β∂ ∂ >  if 1xs →  and 
0gs → ), because the gain due to a higher output level lessens the temptation to generate 
unexpected monetary shocks. Thus, a rise in corruption, although always implying a fall in 
public expenditure (see Appendix A: 0tg β∂ ∂ > ), can eventually improve the intratemporal 
distribution of distortionary losses through its impact on both monetary and fiscal policy 
choices. 
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The alleviation of the credibility problem of monetary policy by the development of 
corruption is a noticeable and interesting feature. This stems from the fact that the worsening 
of some problems within an economic system already facing other inefficiencies can 
theoretically raise welfare because all these distortions tend to offset one another in the 
aggregate. In the present model, the “monetary distortion” due to excessive inflation 
originating in the lack of commitment turns out to be balanced by the “institutional distortion” 
created by the erosion of the government’s ability to collect revenue through formal tax 
channels. From the standpoint of a government that is much more concerned with output 
fluctuations than with price stability or public goods provision, an increment in the level of 
tax leakage can help to deal with commitment problems because the optimal response then 
consists in cutting the tax rate, which boosts employment and lessens the incentive to create 
surprise inflation, hence lower intratemporal losses. 
The effect of corruption, however, appears to be very dependent on the values of the 
various weight parameters in (3). In a general way, the above result no longer holds with a 
government that does not heavily penalize output deviations. To see this, let us examine the 
polynomial of degree two in β  in square brackets in the numerator of the partial derivative 
(6). Leaving aside the trivial case 0β = , the first-order condition intra 0DL β∂ ∂ =  is satisfied if: 
 
( ) ( )2 3 0x g x g x x gs s s s s s s s spi piβ β− + − + − − =  (9) 
The discriminant ∆  of this polynomial in β  equals ( )( )2 29 4x g x g x x gs s s s s s s s spi pi+ + − − . A 
sufficient condition to have 0∆ >  is x gs s spi> + , which holds only if the government attaches 
enough importance to its output objective. In that case, the two real roots are ( )( )
3
1 2
x g
x g
s s
s s spi
β ∆−
+
=
 
and ( )( )
3
2 2
x g
x g
s s
s s spi
β ∆ +
+
= − . The latter must be ignored for 0∆ >  since 0β ≥  by assumption, 
whereas the former lies within the range [ ]0, 1  if 3 2 5x g g x gs s s s s spi≤ ∆ ≤ + . Accordingly, a 
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rise in the corruption level exerts damaging effects (i.e. intra 0DL β∂ ∂ < ) if ( )( )32 1x gx g
s s
s s spi
β∆−
+
< ≤  but 
is welfare-improving (i.e. intra 0DL β∂ ∂ > ) if ( )( )320 x gx g
s s
s s spi
β ∆−
+
≤ < . The intratemporal loss, however, 
is continuously increasing in β  over the entire interval [ ]0, 1  for sufficiently large values of 
xs  such that 1 1β > , implying that more corruption is beneficial in that case. 6  As 
aforementioned, the welfare-improving impact of weak public governance as regards the 
intratemporal component results from both lower inflation and higher output in equilibrium. 
But deterioration in institutional quality is likely to make a country worse off if the authorities 
do not place as large a weight on output, since a greater level of corruption then involves 
raising either the tax rate or the inflation rate to compensate for the lost revenue.7 
In particular, it is worth considering the case 10 1β< < , as it means that corruption, when 
starting from a low level (i.e. 1β ≈ ), initially harms welfare, but exerts a beneficial effect 
afterwards, once the leakage of tax revenue passes a certain threshold (i.e. 1β β< ). Thus, 
from the policymaker’s standpoint, the incentive to struggle against corruption and promote 
better governance might depend on the scale of the problem. According to the model, there is 
a reason to fight corruption as long as the perceived quality of institutions remains relatively 
high. On the other hand, if there already is a massive leakage of tax revenue owing to 
institutional failure, the authorities might no longer be inclined to devote effort to improving 
public governance. 
                                                 
6
. This is for instance the case when 0.8xs =  and 0.1gs spi = =  in (3). 
7
. As an example, corruption worsens welfare if the three objectives are weighted equally in the 
quadratic loss function (i.e. 13x gs s spi = = = ). 
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As an illustration, consider the case with 0.3spi = , 0.6xs =  and 0.1gs = : for this set of 
values, despite the higher weight on the output gap relative to the price stability and 
government spending objectives, the intratemporal loss function admits a maximum at 
0.53β ≈ . Therefore, for a very high initial quality of institutions (i.e. 1β ≈ ), a rise in 
corruption at first causes additional welfare losses on account of the drop in public spending. 
If the decline in β  continues, corruption begins to exert a positive effect once the leakage of 
tax revenue roughly exceeds 50% , because the gain resulting from lower inflation and higher 
output then covers the cost caused by the fall in public expenditure. Thus, within this 
modeling framework, countries experiencing severe governance problems may no longer 
have interest in seriously tackling the corruption issue beyond some point, which well 
corresponds to the poor-institution trap put forward by Huang and Wei (2006). However, 
whereas such a phenomenon is explained by the cost of anti-corruption measures in their 
analysis, the present paper emphasizes the potential positive role of weak public governance 
as an institutional failure likely to offset other distortions and to eventually reduce 
intratemporal losses. 
 
 
5. DOES CORRUPTION YIELD EXCESSIVE DEBT ACCUMULATION? 
 
This section investigates the consequences of malfunctioning institutions for the intertemporal 
distribution of distortions across the two periods of the game and the conditions under which 
corruption might again exert a positive effect on welfare. The first step consists in examining 
the impact of a change in the value of the fiscal capacity index on the equilibrium amount of 
debt, which is given by 1 1
D D D Dd dβ ρ ρ β∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ×∂ ∂ . It follows from the results of Section 
3 that: 
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( )
1
2
1 1
D
D D
d
Rρ ρ
∂ Ψ
= −
∂  + + 
 (10) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2
2
1 1 2 1 1 2D x g x g g xR s s s s s s s spi piρ β β β β βρ
β
  + + + + + + −∂   
=
∂ Ω
 
(11) 
 
These two partial derivatives allow us to formulate Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2. Corruption boosts the accumulation of public debt when the policymaker 
assigns more importance to the output objective than to price stability. 
 
Proof. 1 0
D Dd ρ∂ ∂ <  in any case and 0Dρ β∂ ∂ >  when 1xs →  and 0spi → . In consequence, 
1 0
Dd β∂ ∂ <  if 1xs →  and 0spi → . ■ 
 
The explanation of the result stated in Proposition 2 is very simple. In this model, 
corruption raises the shadow price of collecting regular taxes relative to collecting seigniorage 
revenues, which leads the government to review the way of financing public expenditure (that 
is, the split between seigniorage, taxation and borrowing). As seen before, a rise in corruption 
involves lowering the tax and inflation rates if priority is given to output stabilization (i.e. if 
1xs →  and ,  0gs spi → ), so the first-period policymaker borrows more to compensate for the 
lost revenue. 
The model implies that the amount of public debt is likely to be larger in nations where 
the problems of bad governance, poor economic management and corruption are more severe. 
This, indeed, is what is observed empirically. According to the Transparency International 
index measuring the level of corruption, many of the countries facing the greatest challenges 
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as regards weak public governance and corruption are also ranked among the poorest and the 
most highly indebted in the world.8 
Let us now consider the consequences of corruption for the intertemporal loss factor. It 
follows from (5c) that: 
 
( )( )
( )
inter
3
2 1
1 1
D
D D
RL
R
ρ
ρ ρ
+ Ξ − Ω∂
=
∂  Ω + + 
 (12) 
 
By making use of (11) and (12), we can establish Proposition 3: 
 
Proposition 3. More corruption leads to lower intertemporal welfare losses by boosting 
public debt accumulation when the government is “weight-liberal” and cares more about 
output deviations than it does about price stability. 
 
Proof. Note that inter inter
D D D DL Lβ ρ ρ β∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ×∂ ∂  and Ξ > Ω  as long as 0β > . Hence, 
according to (12), inter 0D DL ρ∂ ∂ >  ∀ 0β > . Moreover, 0Dρ β∂ ∂ >  if 1xs →  and 0spi → , as 
seen from (11). Therefore, inter 0DL β∂ ∂ >  ∀ 0β >  when 1xs →  and 0spi → . ■ 
 
Proposition 3 seems counterintuitive at first sight, for it suggests that more debt should be 
issued for improving welfare, but it draws its theoretical rationale from the inflationary bias 
associated with discretionary monetary policy. Note that the positive sign of inter
D DL ρ∂ ∂  as 
long as there is not a complete leakage of tax revenue (i.e. 0β > ) means that the stock of 
public debt carried over from the first period into the second is inefficiently low in the 
discretionary equilibrium, since a smaller value of the effective discount factor, and thus a 
                                                 
8
. By making use of the same index, Ciocchini, Durbin and Ng (2003) find that the emerging 
economies that are perceived as more corrupt must pay a higher risk premium when issuing bonds, 
and so that corruption significantly impacts borrowing costs for governments and firms in emerging 
markets. 
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larger amount of debt (see (10)), would entail a decrease in the intertemporal loss component. 
As already shown by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), if inflation expectations in the first 
period are predetermined from the standpoint of the government when setting debt policy, 
expectations in the second period, in contrast, are endogenous and not yet determined. The 
government then is induced to employ debt policy strategically in order to influence second-
period inflation expectations, and so future economic performance. The lack of commitment 
makes that long-term inflation expectations are too high from an ex ante perspective. 
Therefore, the policymaker can alleviate the long-run inflationary bias by issuing less debt: as 
the distortionary tax rate needed to meet future debt payment obligations will be lower, the 
incentive to engage in a surprise monetary expansion will be lessened as well, hence a lower 
equilibrium rate of inflation in the second period of the game. Such a strategic behavior is 
formally captured in the model by the ratio Ξ Ω  in the expression for the effective discount 
factor Dρ . The presence of this ratio raises the second-period costs of additional debt and 
thereby constitutes a credibility effect: given that Ξ > Ω  ∀ 0β > , the effective discount 
factor is higher and, correspondingly, public debt is lower under discretion than under 
commitment (see Section 3, footnote 5). 
Nonetheless, the problem here is that the trade-off between the cost of additional 
distortions in the first period and the gain in the credibility of monetary policy in the second 
period is suboptimal and leads to an equilibrium debt stock that is too low compared to the 
benchmark solution. This is because the government is induced to rely more heavily on first-
period financing in the form of unanticipated inflation in order to build up public assets. As 
such an incentive is correctly anticipated by the private sector, the discretionary regime is 
characterized by an asset bias (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1997). Accordingly, a rise in 
corruption (i.e. 0β → ) makes it possible to reduce the asset bias by pushing debt 
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accumulation in the direction of its second best, and thereby exerts a welfare-improving effect 
once again. 
It should nevertheless be stressed that this beneficial effect requires the policymaker’s 
subjective rate of time preference and that of society not to differ too much from each other. 
In fact, in a slightly different model with a myopic government, in the sense that it focuses 
more on short-term performance because its discount factor is lower than that of society, 
possibly owing to political instability or a high probability of being voted out of office, one 
could have inter 0
D DL ρ∂ ∂ < . In that case, as a decrease in Dρ  would cause larger intertemporal 
losses, the equilibrium debt stock would turn out to be too large instead of too small. More 
corruption would then be damaging since a fall in β  would exacerbate the initial debt bias. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has explored the impact of institutional quality on welfare in a simple two-period 
setup with time inconsistency. Our main finding is that corruption can, in theory, make a 
country better off if its government is unable to make binding commitments and assigns a 
larger weight on output stabilization than on the other objectives. 
Admittedly, the case for a positive effect of corruption as regards the intertemporal 
distribution of distortions looks quite implausible, given it presupposes an inefficiently low 
debt level that hardly fits empirical observation in less developed nations. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that the overall impact of corruption might still be positive in a country suffering 
from excessive debt because led by a short-termist decisionmaker whose preferences differ 
from those of society. In our study, this theoretically requires the gain resulting from lower 
intratemporal distortions to outweigh the higher intertemporal loss caused by the rise in public 
debt. Whether the net impact will be positive or not depends on the discount factor and the 
weight parameters in the policymaker’s quadratic loss function. 
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More broadly, the paper supports the view that the degree of anti-inflationary credibility 
could be an important factor in the fight against corruption. A policymaker who is able to 
commit always has an interest in fighting corruption. On the other hand, the motivation to 
really tackle this challenge may be questioned under discretion. We think the uncertainty 
regarding the potential effect of reforms intended to strengthen institutions might partly 
explain why the issue of bad governance and its associated problems of corruption and 
political instability remain more prevalent in countries lacking credibility. Hence, the present 
analysis reinforces the possibility of a poor-institution trap highlighted by Huang and Wei 
(2006), but without modeling the disutility of the effort aimed at improving institutional 
quality. 
A number of further extensions are possible to this model. One of these would be to 
introduce decentralized policymaking with an independent central bank to explicitly take into 
account the strategic interactions between players endowed with heterogeneous preferences. 
This would make it possible to explore the consequences of corruption for debt accumulation 
and welfare according to the cooperative or non-cooperative nature of the policy game. 
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